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Introduction
The globalisation process together with technological advancements, dilution of trade barriers and liberalisation as well as privatisation programs have shaped the global landscape, which has resulted in the augmentation of cross-border businesses.
The expansion of businesses beyond the national borders has raised the issues of international anti-competitive practices. On the one hand, businesses are becoming international, whereas competition laws are national with their curbs and limits. Due to these boundaries, national competition authorities are unable to address international anti-competitive behaviour effectively, especially if the authority lacks experience, knowledge or resources and does not have vision when the anticompetitive issues are transcending their domestic boundaries. As a result, some international anti-competitive transactions can escape any regulatory mechanism. On the other hand, globalisation and therefore international anti-competitive practices have driven competition authorities to apply their laws beyond national boundaries.
Many countries have introduced the extra-territoriality principle, where national competition authorities apply their domestic law to extra-territorial conduct that has effects in their nations. Hence, extra-territorial effects of competition bring various countries competition laws into contact and quite often in confrontation. Apart from the harm that may be caused to the relationship between the different countries, conflicting results may be damaging to the firms concerned, who usually are agitated if their transactions are subjected by various competition authorities. For instance, if a cross-border merger was approved by one side of the Atlantic, but blocked by the other, this conflicting result would place an unnecessary burden on the undertakings involved. Firms are concerned about the cost of their international transactions due to these conflicting or duplicative policies by different national competition authorities.
Problems in dealing with these cross-border challenges have brought scholars and 1 The ICN is devoted exclusively to competition law enforcement. Although, it does not exercise any rule-making function, the ICN can issue recommendations or "best practices" and then individual competition authorities decide whether and how to implement the recommendations, through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate. For further information, see web-site: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 2 The OECD has been active in encouraging soft convergence amongst member countries by adopting a number of non-binding Recommendations on competition law and policy. For However, the ITO never materialised and the Charter was deemed to fail after the US Senate objected partly because the US's concern over inability to enforce its own antitrust law. All that survived after the ITO was the General Agreement on Tariffs and similar lines, the differences in objectives may even further the problem. The WTO's main task is to deal with trade policy, which is mainly concerned with market-access.
If the scope of the WTO was extended to include competition rules (as suggested by some scholars 25 ), then it may appear that competition policy at the WTO would be overwhelmed by the market access norms of trade policy at the expense of distorting the consumer welfare norm of competition law and policy, especially if there was a conflict between them, the WTO would most likely decide in favour of trade norms.
No matter how these two sets of norms reconcile in theory, they cannot work happily in practice. 26 This might suggest that a clear set of rules should be reached with the boundaries being made between trade and competition policies. Otherwise, when
there is an overlap in competition and trade policy issues, different conclusions may be reached regarding the effect of a particular restraint.
The nature of competition issues is too complex to be cast in a binding international regime established and enforced by a dispute settlement body, such as the WTO which lacks the legitimacy and expertise to manoeuvre the difficult analytical tools of competition law. Lee argues that to allow WTO tribunals to exercise a judicial-creating or gap-filling role would stagger the legitimacy of not only the dispute settlement mechanism but also of the WTO system as a whole 27 developing or small countries would be taken into consideration vis-à-vis competition issues.
Finally, benefits and costs analysis should also be mentioned. It may be the case that an international competition law agreement is not worth having if the gains to achieve it are outweighed by the implementation costs. Although there is a demand for international competition law, but in relation to the costs of an international regime, the benefits could be just too small. It has to be taken into account that each nation would have to deviate from its competition policy (presumably tailored to serve its needs) to compromise on a common international regime 32 .
To summarise, an 'ideal' model, which assumes that "one size fits all" is unlikely to be created in the near future. The differences in competition law and policies and economic development between nations make the harmonisation an ambitious task that requires outstanding efforts from all members to reach consensus on multilateral agreement.
Conclusion
International competition law addresses complex issues. On the one hand, the However, on the other hand, reaching an agreement among many countries with too diverging competition cultures and at different development scales becomes a formidable task. Countries do not share common competition policy traditions; the model that suits developed countries is not necessarily ideal for developing countries.
Although the WTO with its well established dispute resolution mechanism has its benefits, the lack of consensus among the nations on international competition policy and law suggests that an international system of antitrust is unlikely to appear on the horizon in the near future. 32 For further discussion, see Elhauge and Geradin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Hart, 2007, pp.1011-1012.
